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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the Ninth Circuit properly hold that the Child Pornography and Prevention Act of 1996 
(“CPPA”) is a content-based restriction of speech because it singles out and bans an entire 
type of speech?
2. Did the Ninth Circuit properly hold that the CPPA is subject to strict scrutiny and 
unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest?
3. Did The Ninth Circuit properly hold that the CPPA is unconstitutional because it is 
overbroad in its prohibition of material that has been accorded first amendment protection?
4. Did the Ninth Circuit Properly hold that the CPPA is vague and thus unconstitutional because 
it fails to provide adequate notice and encourages arbitrary enforcement of the law?
5. Does the affirmative defense provided in the CPPA prevent overbroad application and 
support a compelling interest claimed by Congress?
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No. 00-795
In the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
March Term, 2002
John Ashcroft, et al..
Petitioners,
- against-
The Free Speech Coalition, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, Free Speech Coalition, respectfully submit this brief and request that this 
Court AFFIRM the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and 
permanently enjoin enforcement of the provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996 which criminalize the production, distribution and presentation of non-obscene materials 
featuring performances by adults who “appear to be minors” as well as performances that 
“convey the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.” The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 is unconstitutional as
1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute is reviewed de novo. See 
Crawford v. Lungren. 96 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, Free Speech Coalition, on its own behalf and on behalf of its 
members, Bold Type, Inc., Jim Gingerich, and Ron Raffaelli (“Respondents”) filed their 
complaint against John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, and the United States 
Department of Justice (“Petitioners”) for declaratory and injunctive relief, by a pre-enforcement 
challenge, seeking to permanently enjoin enforcement of certain provisions of the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”). (J.A. 1.) Petitioners alleged that the CPPA 
criminalizes the production, distribution and presentation of non-obscene materials featuring 
performances by adults who “appear to be minors” as well as performances that “convey the 
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.” (J.A. 1-2.) Petitioners further alleged that the CPPA’s failure to define certain 
terms and phrases crucial to its enforcement renders it unconstitutionally vague and that its 
failure to provide clear guidelines on what materials are prohibited create an unconstitutional 
prior restraint on constitutionally-protected forms of expression. (J.A. 6-7.)
a result of its impermissible infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the First and Fifth
Amendment of the United Stales Constitution.
On August 12, 1997, the United District Court granted Respondents’ motion for summary
judgment and denied Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment by finding that the CPPA meets
constitutional standards as is constitutional as written. (J.A. 85-86.)
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On August 13» 1997, Petitioners filed their notice of appeal from the District Court’s 
decision and judgment. (J.A. 87-90.)
On December 17, 1999, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment, holding 
that the CPPA’s definition of the phrases “appears to be” a minor, and “conveys the impression” 
that the depiction portrays a minor, are vague and overbroad and do not meet the requirements of 
the First Amendment. Free Speech Coalition v. Janet Reno.198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir.
1999).
On November 16, 2000, Petitioners filed a Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. (J.A. 114.)
On January 22, 2(X)1, this Court granted Certiorari. (J.A. 117-18.)
Statement of Facts
Respondent Free Speech Coalition is a trade association, representing more than six 
hundred businesses and individuals involved in the production, distribution, sale and presentation 
of non-obscene, adult-oriented materials. (J.A. 2-3.) It was formed in 1991 to assist its 
members in the exercise of their First Amendment rights and in the defense of those rights 
against censorship. (J.A. 2-3.) Respondent Bold Type, Inc. a publishing corporation,
Respondent Jim Gingerich an artist, and Respondent Ron Raffaelli, a professional photographer 
join Free Speech Coalition in this action (J.A. 3.) Respondents do not advocate or tolerate the 
production or distribution of child pornography and have assisted in the eradication of such 
materials. (J.A. 3.)
The CPPA is Congress’ latest attempt to fix the deficiencies that have been evident since 
its first legislative enactment in this area in 1997. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1087. The 
original federal legislation specifically prohibiting the sexual exploitation of children has been
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amended multiple times since it was enacted as the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act of 1977. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1087. The Act had its problems in 
that only one person was convicted under the Act’s prohibited production of minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct. |d As a consequence of the law’s deficiencies, Congress enacted 
Child Protection Act of 1984 which did away with obscenity requirement under Miller v. 
California. 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and raised the age limit of the minor(s) used in the production 
from 16 years old to 18 years old. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1088. Again, Congress 
did not get the results it had hoped for and in 1986 amended the law once again to ban the 
advertisement of child pornography by passing the Child Abuse Victims Rights Act of 1986. Id 
In 1988, Congress then passed the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988 
which made it unlawful to use a computer to transport, distribute, or receive child pornography. 
Id. In 1990, and again in 1994, Congress once again amended the law to hopefully repair earlier 
deficiencies. Id. Then in 1996, as a consequence of repeated failures and shortcomings in its 
attempt to provide proper constitutional legislation to combat the sexual exploitation of children. 
Congress enacted the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 on or about September 30,
1996. (J.A. 3.) The CPPA, like its predecessors, is a continuation of Congress’s failure to 
achieve its goal as it infringes on the constitutionally protected rights of adults. The CPPA goes 
way beyond Congress’ earlier attempts by including expression that is constitutionally protected.
Although Respondents are adamantly opposed to child pornography and do not seek to 
interfere with the government’s efforts to combat the sexual exploitation of children, this lawsuit 
was filed as a pre-enforcement challenge in order to avoid the possible prosecution and 
incarceration of individuals who engage in constitutionally protected speech. (J.A. 3.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The CPPA is unconstitutional because it violates the First and Fifth Amendments of the 
Constitution. The CPPA is a content-based restriction of speech and is therefore subject to strict 
scrutiny. The CPPA is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The 
government has no compelling interest in banning non-obscene materials that do not depict 
actual minors. The government has no compelling interest in banning the dissemination of 
pornographic images because they may whet the appetites of pedophiles, nor because the 
material may be morally or aesthetically repugnant. The only compelling interest the 
government has is the protection of the physical and psychological well-being of actual children, 
and the CPPA is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
The CPPA is unconstitutionally overbroad because it not only impermissibly suppresses 
material that is protected under the First Amendment but it bans a wide array of non-obscene 
material that has serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value. Further, the affirmative 
defense provided does not protect individuals from its overbroad application. The CPPA is also 
unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide the kind of notice that wilt enable ordinary 
people to understand what conduct it prohibits and it allows arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement by police, judges and juries.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 1996 IS A CONTENT-BASED
RESTRICTION OF SPEECH BECAUSE IT SINGLES OUT AND BANS AN 
ENTIRE TYPE OF SPEECH.
“The ‘principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality ... is whether the government 
has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it
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conveys.”’ Turner Broadcasting System. Inc, v. FCC. 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (quoting Ward 
V Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). “As a general rule, laws that by their terms 
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed 
are content-based.” Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 384 (9lh Cir. 1996). Put slightly 
differently, this Court has also said that “any restriction on speech, the application of which turns 
on the content of the speech, is a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies 
behind it.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all determined that the Child 
Pornography Act of 1996 is a content-based restriction on speech. United States v. Hilton, 167 
F.3d 61, 69 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 2(XX)); United 
States V. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 4(X) (5th Cir. 2001); Free Speech Coalition v. Janet Reno, 198 F.3d 
1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 19911: United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999).
The First Circuit stated that the CPPA “fails both tests for substantive neutrality: it expressly 
aims to curb a particular category of expression (child pornography) by singling out that type of 
expression and banning it. Blanket suppression of an entire type of speech is by its very nature a 
content-discriminating act.” Hilton, 167 F.3d at 68. The Ninth Circuit similarly stated that “the 
Hilton court’s determination that blanket suppression of an entire type of speech is a content- 
discriminating act is a legal conclusion with which we agree. The child pornography law is at its 
essence founded upon content-based classification of speech.” Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d 
at 1090-91.
The CPPA is irrefutably a content-based statute under every definition issued by this 
Court and those subsequently expounded by the circuit courts. The statute bans, in part, “any 
visual depiction ... of explicit sexual conduct” where such visual depiction “is or appears to be.
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of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (1996). In order to 
determine whether a violation of the statue has taken place, the content of the image must be 
scrutinized. Such scrutinizing illustrates the very essence of a content-based statute: it is aimed 
at the communicative impact of the speech. The CPPA does not merely restrict the time, place 
or manner of speech. Instead, it constitutes a total ban on certain types of disfavored speech. 
Hilton, 167 F.3d at 69.
II. THE CPPA IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO SERVE A COMPELLING 
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.
When a statute is content-based, it is presumed to be unconstitutional. R.A.V. v. City ofSt. 
Paul. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). In order to defeat this presumption, the government must 
establish that it is regulating the content of the speech in order to promote a compelling interest 
and that it has chosen the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. Boos, 485 
U.S. at 321, 329. According to the government, the CPPA was designed to address three 
compelling interests. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1091. First, that child pornography 
“requires the participation of actual children in sexually explicit situations to create the images. 
Id, Secondly, that the “dissemination of such pornographic images may encourage more sexual 
abuse of children because it whets the appetite of pedophiles.” Id, Lastly, “that such images are 
morally and aesthetically repugnant.” Id, at 1092. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress 
“has not provided a compelling interest” and thus did “not address the ‘narrow tailoring 
requirement.” Id. at 1095.
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A. The State Has No Compelling Interest In Banning Non-Obscene Materials
That Do Not Depict Actual Minors.
It is well settled law that the protection of minors used in the production of child 
pornography is a compelling interest of the federal government. New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 
747, 756-57 (1982). A state’s “interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well­
being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” Id (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. 457 
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). The problem, however, is that the language of the CPPA can criminalize 
the use of fictional images that involve no human being. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 
1092. “Images that are, or can be, entirely the product of the mind are criminalized.” Id In 
addition, the court noted that the constitutionality of a definition including phrases such as 
“appears to be” and “conveys the impression” is not supported by existing case law.” Id The 
Ninth Circuit aptly observed that “nothing in Ferber can be said to justify the regulation of such 
materials other than the protection of actual children used in the production of child 
pornography.” Id
1. The CPPA goes bevond the compellin2 interest of protecting real children.
While the protection of real children is a compelling interest, the CPPA goes beyond that 
interest. Child pornography is defined as “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, 
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced 
by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct....”
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). Accordingly, a computer-generated image or picture need not involve a 
real person whatsoever. This Court has stated before that materials or depictions of sexual 
conduct “which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of 
live performances, [retain] First Amendment protection.” Ferber. 458 U.S. at 765. The Ninth 
Circuit recognized that the CPPA is a significant departure from Ferber in that “the language of
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the statute criminalizes even those materials that do not involve a recognizable minor.” Free 
Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1092. Therefore, the CPPA goes beyond the compelling interest 
articulated by the government by making criminal activities protected by the First Amendment, 
namely, free expression not involving the use of real minors.
2. Banning the dissemination of pornographic images because they may whet the 
appetites of pedophiles is not a compelling interest.
The second “compelling” interest advanced by the government before the Ninth Circuit 
was that “dissemination of [such] pornographic images may encourage more sexual abuse of 
children because it whets the appetite of pedophiles.” Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1091. 
While the government contends that this is a “secondary effect” of child pornography that 
justifies a restriction on protected speech, their argument is based on a fundamental 
misconception of the so-called secondary effects doctrine.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986), sets forth the 
“secondary effects” doctrine upon which the goyernment relies. In Renton, a zoning ordinance 
enacted by the city of Renton, Washington, prohibited adult motion picture theatres from 
locating within 1 ,(X)0 feet of “any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, 
park or school.” Id at 43. There, the City explained that such businesses “would have a severe 
impact upon surrounding businesses and residences.” Id at 42. Although the Court recognized 
that the statute was indeed content-based, and not a neutral time, place or manner restriction, it 
recognized that a city’s “‘interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that 
must be accorded high respect.’” |d at 39 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 
50, 71 (1976)). More specifically, the concerns were the effects of crime and diminished 
property values. Id at 48. Because the statute in Renton only regulated secondary effects, strict 
scrutiny was not applied and this Court held that the “appropriate inquiry in [this] case, then, is
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whether the Renton ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows 
for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 39. The Court 
concluded that “it is clear that the ordinance meets such a standard.” Id
The government fundamentally misconceives of the notion of secondary effects in 
contending that the CPPA is designed to eliminate them. In Renton, the adult motion picture 
theatres were thought to have a harmful effect on the surrounding neighborhoods, not on the 
patrons or viewers of the films themselves. Diminished property values, an increase in crime 
rates, and a less secure retail trade - the “secondary effects” with which the Renton Court was 
concerned, are unrelated to the message of the adult films. If Renton had held that the 
secondary effect of adult motion picture theatres was the creation of potential sex crimes, the 
government’s argument in this case, that the viewing of images whets the appetites of 
pedophiles, would be analogous. Instead, it is an unwarranted twisting of existing law. The 
government is cloaking a “primary” effect of the viewing of such images in the secondary effects 
language of Renton in an effort to change fundamental American jurisprudence. Furthermore, 
this Court has already clarified that if the ordinance at issue in Renton had been justified “by the 
city’s desire to prevent the psychological damage it felt was associated with viewing adult 
movies, then analysis of the measure as a content-based statute would have been appropriate.” 
Boos V. Barry. 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
Over fifty years ago, this Court stated that the “right to receive information and ideas, 
regardless of their social worth ... is fundamental to our free society.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557, 564 (1969). The fact that these ideas may whet the appetites of any one group or 
another is simply constitutionally irrelevant. “[The] assertion that the Stale has the right to 
control the moral content of a person’s thoughts ... may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly
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inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment ” Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66.
“Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public 
morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a 
person’s private thoughts.” Id at 566.
Here, if the government is worried that the dissemination of images that do not involve 
the use of real children will cause further harm to children, the appropriate remedy is certainly 
not the restriction of free expression. It is established law that if the state is concerned about 
printed or filmed materials inducing antisocial conduct, “among free men, the deterrents 
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law.’ 
Whitney V. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The attempt to 
preempt antisocial conduct through the restriction of free expression of ideas is inimical to a free 
society. “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power 
to control men’s minds.” Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. If the government here is allowed to deter 
the exploitation of real children that occurs in the production of child pornography by banning 
fictional images that might induce such exploitation, the same arguments can later be made for a 
myriad of social ills. Literature on guerilla warfare and terrorism will be banned because it may 
whet the appetites of potential terrorists; Mien Kampf will be banned as it could whet the 
appetites of racial supremacists; and, perhaps even Playboy will be banned as it whets the 
appetites of potential sexual predators.
The Ninth Circuit stated in Crawford that “listeners’ reactions to speech are not the type 
of ‘secondary effects’ [we] referred to in Renton” and that “regulations that focus on the direct 
impact of speech on its audience present a different situation.” 96 F.3d at 385. The statute in 
question there was “concerned with psychological damage to readers and, therefore, targets the
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direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be 
associated with that type of speech.” Crawford. 96 F.3d at 385 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
Here, the government has not pointed to one true secondary effect that is a result of 
viewing images that “appear to be” of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; it has 
pointed only to primary effects. The Ninth Circuit refused to accept the government’s secondary 
effects argument. Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1083. The regulation or prohibition of 
images that produce primary effects upon their viewers is nothing less than thought control. See 
Boos. 485 U.S. at 321. If the government is frustrated in its efforts to stop the business of child 
pornography. Respondents urge that this Court not lessen their burden by sanctioning thought 
control in a new and frightening manner. To do so would indeed require a fundamental shift in 
First Amendment jurisprudence. Free Speech Coalition, 198F.3dat 1094-95.
American Booksellers Association. Inc, v. Hudnut. 771 F.2d 323, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1985), 
dealt with a similar attempt by the government to alter social behavior through the dissemination 
of ideas inimical to some, if not most, of the general population. In Hudnut. the city of 
Indianapolis enacted an ordinance “defining ‘pornography’ as a practice that discriminates 
against women.” Id at 324. “Pornography,” under the ordinance, was defined as “the graphic 
sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words ...” Id The Court 
immediately countered with the assertion that “the stale may not ordain preferred viewpoints in 
this way. The Constitution forbids the slate to declare one perspective right and silence 
opponents.” Id at 325. The central theme of the case was that the ordinance was an attempt at 
thought control. In striking down the statute, the court in Hudnut reasoned that “[s]peech that 
‘subordinates women and also, for example, presents women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or 
rape, or even simply presents women in ‘positions of servility or submission or display’ is
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forbidden, no matter how great the political value of the work taken as a whole.” Hudnut, 771 
F.2d at 328. Just as in the case before this Court today, the city of Indianapolis “justirie[d] the 
ordinance on the ground that pornography affects thoughts.” Id In Free Speech Coalition the 
Ninth Circuit slated that “if the fact that speech plays a role in a process of conditioning were 
enough to permit governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of speech. 198 
F.3d at 1093. This simply has never been, and ought never to be, a compelling slate interest. To 
declare it so today would erode over two centuries of First Amendment jurisprudence. To do so 
would require a “remarkable shift” in the First Amendment paradigm. Id at 1094-95. It would, 
in effect, turn First Amendment jurisprudence “on its head.” Id
3. Banning material that may be morally or aesthetically repugnant is not a 
compelling Interest.
The third compelling interest advanced by the government is that “such images are 
morally and aesthetically repugnant.” Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1092. In Ferber, this 
Court stated that “the value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of 
children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis. 458 U.S. at 
763. Yet, this case is distinguishable from the statement made by Justice White in Ferber. De 
minimis” social value is not a proxy for speech unprotected by the First Amendment, it is merely 
a normative judgment. There are many who would argue that Lolita, Nabokov s famous literary 
work, has substantially more than a “de minimis” social value. In fact, however, there are 
hundreds of gainfully employed professors across the country who assert that Nabokov’s work 
has great literary, artistic or social value. If the CPPA were drafted to include not only visual, 
but literary depictions, then perhaps Lolita would be outlawed as well, since it too may be 
“morally and aesthetically repugnant.” In fact, the Ferber court even suggested using young­
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looking adults or simulations as constitutionally protected alternatives to the use of actual 
children. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763.
B. The CPPA Is Not Narrowly Tailored To Serve A Compelling Governmental Interest 
And Fails Strict Scrutiny Because It 1^ Overinclusive.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that because Congress had not provided a compelling 
interest, they did not have to address the narrowly tailoring requirement. Free Speech Coalition, 
198 F.3d at 1095. Assuming, however, that there is a compelling interest here, it can only be the 
protection of real children, but the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The 
scrutiny to be applied to a content-based restriction of speech is that the regulation is necessary 
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Peiry 
Education Assn, v. Perry Local Educators Assn., 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
Here, the CPPA as drafted criminalizes conduct that is unrelated to the compelling 
interest of protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children. It is in this sense 
that the statute is not narrowly tailored. It criminalizes the possession of images that appear to be 
minors but are not, on the assumption that technology has advanced so much that it is the only 
effective way to combat harm to real children. (J.A. 38-39.) Advancing technology should not 
be a trump card in our courts. If it were, the role of precedent would be virtually nil today since 
technology is so rapidly changing our entire society and the issues before our courts.
Furthermore, there is no demonstrable link between computer generated images that appear to be 
minors and harm to actual children. As the Ninth Circuit concluded, “factual studies that 
establish the link between computer-generated child pornography and the subsequent sexual 
abuse of children apparently do not yet exist.” Free Speech Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1093. In fact, 
the justification for the proposition that there is a causal link between such images and harm to 
actual children came from congressional reliance on a report prepared by the Attorney General s
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Commission on Pornography, a report that predates the technology at issue here. Free Speech 
Coalition. 198 F.3d at 1093. So, a belief in this nexus requires a leap of faith, and in the context 
of the First Amendment, such a leap is inappropriate.
The government also suggests that the only images that will be prosecuted unddr the 
CPPA are those that are “virtually indistinguishable” from minors. (J.A. 44.) This is because 
that phrase makes an appearance in the legislative history. If that is what Congress meant to 
combat, they should have used the more narrow and precise language, not the phrase “appears to 
be.” District attorneys are simply not bound by legislative history, and are even less likely to be 
intimately familiar with it. In the context of constitutionally protected speech, it is not proper for 
the government to contend that an alternative definition buried in the legislative history 
vindicates the use of broad language in the actual statute. Whether an image which is virtually 
indistinguishable from an actual minor is worthy of First Amendment protection is not an issue 
today, but it is conceivable that even this narrower definition does not fall outside the realm of 
speech afforded constitutional protection.
C. Without Proven And Substantial Evidence. The Court Need Not Give Deference To
Congressional Findings.
In the realm of First Amendment questions, Congress must base its conclusions upon 
substantial evidence. United States v. Plavbov Entertainment Group. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 
(2000). Given the deference due a co-equal and representative branch of government, a court is 
not to lightly second guess legislative judgments. United States v. Pearl, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 
1239 (D. Utah 2000). However, an act of Congress should be invalidated for compelling 
constitutional reasons. Id. There is no more compelling reason than protecting the right of free 
expression that is afforded citizens under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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Congress has failed to substantially prove that viewing child pornographic material will 
result in increased activity of pedophilias. Without this, Congress fails to prove they have a 
compelling interest in preventing such expression.
It has long been accepted that unless speech incites immediate and direct harnf, it does 
not fall outside protection of the First Amendment simply because it is found offensive by some 
or affects the thoughts of others. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
In Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku KJux Klan made a speech at a Klan rally and was later 
convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. Id at 445-46. The law made illegal 
advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or 
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id
This Court held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg’s right to free speech. Id at 448. 
This Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate the nature of speech: (1) speech can be prohibited 
if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or 
produce such action." Id at 447. The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and 
teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and leaching would actually 
incite imminent lawless action. Id at 448. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law 
overly broad and in violation of the Constitution. Id
Without proving with substantial evidence the link between viewing child pornography 
and actions by pedophiles. Congress has not shown a compelling interest in protecting minors 
against the presumed effects of non-obscene sexual materials that do not depict actual minors, 
any more than it has a compelling interest in proscribing the effects of violent speech.
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE CPPA IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS OVERBROAD IN ITS PROHIBITION OF
MATERIAL THAT HAS BEEN ACCORDED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION.
The overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise 
of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 
"judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 
601, 612-15 (1973). The CPPA is overbroad because it impermissibly suppresses material that is 
protected under the First Amendment by defining child pornography to include visual depictions 
of adults that “appear to be minors.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). Furthermore, the CPPA is 
overbroad because it bans a wide array of non-obscene material that has serious literary, artistic, 
political and scientific value.
In Broadrick, Oklahoma prohibited its civil servants from soliciting funds from political 
candidates and exhibiting bumper stickers or buttons endorsing political candidates. 413 U.S. at 
606. The Court concluded that that the law was not substantially overbroad because only a 
relatively minor amount of protected expression was banned. Id. at 615. The Oklahoma law was 
specific and finite in its prohibition.
Alternatively, however, the CPPA defines child pornography as “any visual depiction, 
including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or 
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means . .. .”
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). The phrase "computer or computer generated” visual depiction is 
overbroad because it encompasses expression that is constitutionally protected. First, it could be 
interpreted to apply to written materials in addition to visual images. Dictionary definitions for 
"depict" include to characterize, describe, render, or represent. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
of Current English (R.E. Allen ed., 8th ed, Oxford U. Press 1992). Second, it could be
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interpreted to apply to visual images, such as cartoons and other drawings, whose production 
does not involve the use of real children. Thus, the CPPA would criminalize written materials 
and images that are not produced with real minors - both categories of expression that retain 
First Amendment protection.
In Ferber. this Court held that child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment 
because of the compelling government interest in preventing the "sexual exploitation and abuse 
of children." 458 U.S. at 757. The need to protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse is 
at the core of legitimate governmental regulation in this area. However, this Court in Ferber 
recognized the dangers of censorship where definitions of child pornography are not strictly 
limited to visual depictions of children engaged in actual sexual conduct. Id at 764. This Court 
noted that "the distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise 
obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of 
live performances, retain First Amendment protection." Id at 764-65.
To now hold that persons who create such constitutionally protected forms of speech are 
now subject to criminal prosecution would not only destroy the foundations of the First 
Amendment, but it would contradict the holding and substance of Ferber. The lesson of Ferber is 
that where a child has not been sexually abused or exploited, there can be no basis for 
criminalizing a depiction of the child engaged in sexual conduct. 458 U.S. at 764-65. 
Accordingly, a law that is not limited to depiction of actual sexual conduct would be 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally 
protected conduct. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
In Houston v. Hill. 482 U.S. 451, 460 (1987), this Court decided that a Houston 
ordinance making it a crime to “assault, strike, or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse, or
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interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty” was substantially overbroad and thus 
facially invalid. This Court held that the law granted police “unfettered discretion to arrest 
individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them.” Hill, 482 U.S. at 460. Hill simply 
shouted to a police officer that was arresting his friend, “Why don t you pick on someone your 
own size?” Id. at 454. By allowing such arbitrary prosecution, the law gave police a censorship 
function by arresting the speaker who dares criticize perceived law enforcement. Id at 462.
Here, because the CPPA is so overbroad, police would have unregulated discretion in 
arresting individuals because the language of the law would certainly include behavior that the 
police would find to violate the Act..
Further, what Congress claims to be a precise and limited understanding of the “appears 
to be standard” is not realistic. The Senate stated that the “appears to be” standard extends the 
prohibition against child pornography from “photographic depictions of actual minors engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct to the identical type of depiction, one which is virtually 
indistinguishable from the banned photographic depiction .... (J A. 44.) First, the term 
“appears to be” is not equivalent to the terms “identical type’ and indistinguishable. The 
former allows for subjective and arbitrary application while the latter is an objective standard. 
Again, if the legislative intent was to prohibit material that was identical in type to actual child 
pornography that used actual children, it would have used that language. The failure to use this 
language incorrectly permits a substantial amount of non-obscene material to be prohibited. This 
inclusion of constitutionally protected activity makes the Act overbroad. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 
612.
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE CPPA IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS VAGUE.
The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees adequate 
notice of proscribed conduct so that ordinary persons are not required to guess at a law s 
meaning, but rather, can know what conduct is forbidden and act accordingly. U.S. Const, 
amend. V. A law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Cqnnally v. General 
Constmction Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 39! (1926). Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either 
of two independent reasons: first, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable 
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits. Grayncd v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 108-09 (1972). Second, as in the case of it being overly broad, it may authorize and even 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v^ Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 
(1983). The CPPA fails under a vagueness analysis for both reasons.
Chicago V. Morales. 527 U.S. 41,47 (1999) involved an ordinance which required a 
police officer, on observing a person whom he reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang 
member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, to order all such persons to 
disperse, and made failure to obey such an order a violation. This Court in Morales held that the 
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in failing to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and 
was also impermissibly vague in failing to establish minimal guidelines for enforcement.
Morales. 527 U.S. at 63.
Likewise, this Court held that a Massachusetts law making it a crime to “publicly 
mutilate, trample upon, deface or treat contemptuously the flag of the United States” was void 
for vagueness. Smith v. Goguen. 415 U.S. 566, 567-68 (1973). This Court affirmed the First 
Circuit Court’s finding that the statute failed to define what constituted forbidden treatment of
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United States flags. Goeuen. 415 U.S. at 572-73. This Court also held that the law subjected 
individuals to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that authorities were free to react to 
nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag. Id
Similarly to the vague ordinance in Morales and the vague statute in Goguen, the CPPA 
does not provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct or establish minimal guidelines for police 
to enforce. The CPPA’s definition of child pornography extends to drawings or images that 
“appear” to be minors or visual depictions that “convey” the impression that a minor is engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct, whether an actual minor is involved or not. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), 
(D). The two phrases are highly subjective. There is no explicit standard as to what the phrases 
mean. Not only would individuals not have adequate notice to whether or not their expression 
violates the act, but the police could arbitrarily substitute their own definitions of what 
expression is in violation of the law. The law would operate to inhibit the exercise of free speech 
because those who might ordinarily express their constitutionally protected ideas, would avoid 
expressing themselves altogether. Through its vague terms, the CPPA appoints critical policy 
matters to law enforcement officers, judges, and even juries for decision on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis. The arbitrary and discriminatory application of the CPPA holds constitutional
principles of due process hostage to unequal standards.
For example, through the CPPA, juries can criminalizes creators of Web sites that display 
images that are obscene or appeal to prurient interest as judged by contemporary community 
standards.” -See. Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15. 37 (1973). The community-standard 
approach, drawn from this Court's holding in Miller, demonstrates that what is viewed as 
pmrient in conservative areas might not be in more liberal areas. Id However, community 
standards are unworkable in the context of the Internet, whose contents can be viewed worldwide
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no matter where the images are created. The risk is real that speech will be measured by the
standards of the most restrictive community. The truth is that Web publishers are without any
means to limit access to their sites based on the geographic location of particular Internet users.
V. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE PROVIDED IN THE CPPA DOES NOT PREVENT 
OVERBROAD APPLICATION AND DOES NOT SUPPORT A COMPELLING 
INTEREST CLAIMED BY CONGRESS.
The government claims that the affirmative defense offered in the CPPA will ab.solve 
individuals who are not dealing with material that involves the use of real children. This is not 
true. The CPPA provides a limited affirmative defense for violations of the Act if:
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual 
person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was 
produced;and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or 
distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the 
impression that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). It is clear from the language above that the defense is not available unless 
one can prove that the persons depicted are actual adults. The affirmative defense provides no 
help for creators and distributors of work that does not involve the use of live persons, such as 
drawings or cartoons. It would be impossible to prove such a fact when the individuals depicted 
are not real. Thus, the CPPA fails to protect these types of individuals from prosecution and 
imprisonment.
Second, the affirmative defense is not available to someone accused of unlawful 
possession. It would be impossible for a viewer or possessor to show that the material was 
produced using actual persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct and that each such person 
was an adult at the lime the material was produced. This information would most likely not be 
available even if the material was not advertised as child pornography. If a finder of fact
22
believes that the material “appears to be” that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit activity, a 
possessor or viewer in this situation could not prove otherwise.
Finally, the affirmative defense provided in the CPPA reinforces the notion that the real 
concern of Congress is protecting actual children. The affirmative defense is comprised of two 
parts. First, no minors could have been used in the production of the material; and second, the 
material was not marketed in such a manner as to lead the general publie to believe that it did 
involve the use of actual minors. If both of these conditions are met, then no felony has been 
committed. This affirmative defense is clearly in line with the rationale of F^. 458 U.S. at 
764-65. Again, this Court in Ferber was concerned with the welfare of real ehildren and as long 
as actual children were not exploited in the production of the material and the public is not led to
believe the same, then no felony has taken place. Id.
If, however, the government’s concern is that this material will be used to further child
exploitation, by whetting the appetites of pedophiles, the affirmative defense is nothing but a 
loophole. If the person looks like a minor, and the viewer of such material has no reason to 
believe otherwise, how would it whet the appetite any less? Furthermore, how could it be any 
less effective in luring in a child, who is most certainly unlikely to be aware of the fact that the 
model must be a legal adult? Congress, in fact, surmised as much when they staled that “the 
effect is the same whether the child pornography consists of photographic depictions of actual 
children or visual depictions produced wholly or in part by computer.” (J.A. 40.) In summary, 
the very fact that Congress provided this affirmative defense supports the notion that harm to real 
minors in production of sexually explicit material is the real issue at stake. Without providing 
any type of defense for individuals who express their ideas through forms such as cartoons or for 
individuals in possession of material produced with adults without the ability to prove such,
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Congress has neglected to provide protection for those who they claim are not targeted by the
Act. (J.A.44.)
CONCLUSION
The CPPA is patently unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments of the 
Constitution. The CPPA is a content-based restriction of speech that is subject to strict scrutiny 
and is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The Government has 
no compelling interest in banning non-obscene materials that do not depict actual minors. The 
Government also does not have a compelling interest in banning the dissemination of 
pornographic images because they may whet the appetites of pedophiles or because the material 
may be morally or aesthetically repugnant. The CPPA is unconstitutional because it is both 
overbroad and vague and the affirmative defense provided does not protect individuals from 
overbroad application and arbitrary enforcement. Respondents respectfully request that this 
Court AFFIRM the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Counsel for Respondents
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